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Another look at Italian generic sentences 
 
Alda Mari 
Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS, Paris 
 
 
Abstract. In this paper we reconsider the interpretation of indefinite singular generics and definite 
plural generics in Italian. We show that these two types of statements cannot be associated with the 
traditional distinction between definitional vs. accidental generalizations. In particular we argue 
that indefinite generic statements are associated with a variety of interpretations that can be unified 
by reconstructing a hidden abilitative verbal operator triggered by the imperfective interpretation 
of the present tense. We distinguish between two types of abilities as well as between the overt 
abilitative modal and the covert one. We correctly derive the prediction that indefinite singular 
generics cannot be combined with accidental properties, which are perfective in nature. We 
analyze definite plurals as entering the logical form with a situation variable that is responsible for 
the fact that definite plural generics are compatible with accidental properties.  
Key words: indefinite singular generics, plural definite generics, Italian, abilities.  
 
 
 
1     Introduction 
 
 This paper focuses on the interpretation of indefinite singular generic (IS) 
(1-a) and definite plural generic (DG) sentences (1-b) in Italian.1.  
 
(1) a. Un leone ha una coda  
 A lion has a mane  
 b. I leoni hanno una coda  
 The lions have a mane  
 
 The uses of IS and DG sentences in Romance languages correspond, 
respectively, to those of indefinite generic (2-a) and bare plural generics (BP) (2-
b) sentences in English. 
 
(2) a. A lion has a mane 
 b. Lions have a mane  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Definite singular are used in Italian for direct reference to kinds and are not considered here. 
Plural indefinites can only be used in very limited environments in generic sentences and will not 
be considered in this paper (see, e.g., de Swart, 1991; Farkas and de Swart, 2007; Dobrovie-Sorin 
and Laca, 1998; Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari, 2007 for discussion).	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 Like ISs2 and BPs in English, ISs and DGs in Romance do not express the 
same kind of generalizations. ISs have been claimed to express law-like 
statements and to be compatible with essential properties only as the contrast in 
(3-a)-(3-b) illustrates. BPs have been noted to be compatible with both essential 
properties (4-a) and accidental generalizations (4-b) (Lawler, 1973; Dähl, 1975). 
The same observations hold for ISs ((5-a) vs. (5-b)) and DGs ((6-a) vs. (6-b)) in 
Italian. It is now standardly admitted that (5-b) is ruled out because popular is a 
non-definitional property of madrigals. 
 
(3) a. A madrigal is polyphonic  
 b. *A madrigal is popular  
(4) a. Madrigals are polyphonic  
 b. Madrigals are popular  
(5) a. Un madrigale è polifonico / A madrigal is polyphonic  
 b. *Un madrigale è popolare / *A madrigal is popular  
(6) a. I madrigali sono polifonici / ’The’ madrigals are polyphonic  
 b. I madrigali sono popolari / ’The’ madrigals are popular  
 
Much disagreement remains when it comes to the analysis of these 
statements.  
Firstly, it is not settled whether ISs and BPs/DGs must receive a unified 
treatment in terms of generic quantification. Secondly, it remains to be established 
that the above-mentioned characterization of ISs as only able to express law-like 
statements is correct and to what extent. Thirdly, assuming that the meaning of the 
determiner determines the interpretation of the sentence, it cannot be taken for 
granted that one single analysis can extend to all languages. Taking into account 
the meaning of the determiner, we end up with two very different logical forms 
for the two types of statements. We consider ISs in section 2, DGs in section 3. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. We focus here on Italian. The same results extend 
to French.  
 
 
2     IS sentences 
 
2.1    Tripartite structures 
 
Most of the current approaches of ISs are based on the tripartite structure in 
(7). 
 
(7) GEN [restrictor] [matrix] 
 
There are two views of GEN. On the extensional analysis of GEN (see in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   ISs stands for singular indefinite generic sentences ; DGs for definite plural generic sentences 
and BPs for bare plural generc sentences.	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particular Farkas and Fugioka, 1983; de Swart, 1991), GEN means essentially 
always’. It is argued that GEN is triggered by a silent when-clause, on the basis of 
the following argument. (8-a) is interpreted as in (8-b). When a when-clause 
occurs with an overt AdvQ (8-c), the when-clause is considered to provide the 
restriction for the AdvQ. GEN is a silent AdvQ that must have its own restriction. 
A silent when-clause provides its restriction. 
 
(8) a. Fido barks 
 b. Fido barks (when he is hungry)  
 c. Fido usually barks when he is hungry 
 
The resulting LF for (8-a) is as follows: 
 
(9) ALWAYS s [in(s; Fido)][barks(s; Fido)]  
 Always in relevant situations, Fido barks  
 
According to the analyses of indefinites that have adopted this view, 
indefinites are treated as generalized quantifier operating over a domain of 
individuals with an existential interpretation. The existential quantifier is in the 
scope of GEN and thus individuals are indirectly bounded to situations. 
 
(10) a. A dog barks  
 b. ALWAYSs [∃x  dog(x) & in(x, Fido)][barks(x, s)] 
 
 Aside from some other shortcomings (see in particular Rimell, 2004; 
Ferreira, 2005) this analysis fails to explain why ISs are incompatible with 
temporary states when AdvQ is silent (11-a), but are instead compatible with them 
when AdvQ is overt (11-b). 
 
(11) a. *Un madrigale è popolare  
 A madrigal is popular  
 b. Un madrigale è sempre popolare  
 A madrigal is always popular  
 
In the intensional analysis of GEN, (12-a) is interpreted as in (12-b). An if-
clause is reconstructed that provides the restriction for GEN. GEN is interpreted 
as an intensional unselective universal quantifier meaning ’must’ (Krifka et al. 
1995). On the assumption that indefinites contribute a variable ranging over 
individuals (Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982), that variable can be bounded by GEN. 
In accordance with this view, assume a classical modal framework in which 
W is a set of worlds, D is a domain of entities and ≤ is an ordering source on 
worlds according to normality. Modal bases (i.e., the domains of worlds) are of 
various types, and can be circumstantial, deontic, … For (12-a), in which the 
modal base is circumstantial and most normal worlds are quantified over, the 
resulting interpretation is given in (12-c). 
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(12) a.  A dog barks  
 b. If something is a dog, it must barks  
 c. ∀w′≤w,x[dog(x,w′)][barks(x,w′)] 
 Paraphrase: in all normal worlds, if something is a dog, it barks.  
 
Menedez-Benito (2005) has noted that this view predicts for (13-a) that a Ferrari 
goes at 200 km/ph in all accessible worlds, even though it only does in some 
worlds, and one should assume that (13-a) is synonymous with (13-b) rather than 
(13-c). 
 
(13) a. Une Ferrari va a 200 km/ph  
 A Ferrari goes 200 km/ph 
 b. Una Ferrari può andare a 200Km/ph  
 A Ferrari can go at 200 Km/ph  
 c. Una Ferrari deve andare a 200Km/ph  
 A Ferrari must go at 200 Km/ph  
 
 Although the observation is prima facie correct, Krifka et al. (1995:54) did 
not fail to note that not all IS sentences can be paraphrased by ’can’ as the contrast 
in (14-a) - (14-b) illustrates. Contrary to (14-a), (14-b) is odd. 
 
(14) a. Una barca galleggia 
 A boat floats  
 b. ??Una barca può galleggiare  
 ??A boat can float 
 
 Menedez-Benito (ibid.) argues that the silent ’can’ in (13-a) and (14-a) is 
only compatible with ’inner dispositions’. In this respect, it is different from an 
overt ’can’ that is not restricted to such dispositions.  
However, this view cannot extend to all kinds of ISs because inner 
dispositions are not always available as in (15), where a silent ’can’ cannot be 
reconstructed. In this instance we are thus left without directions for the 
interpretation of (15). 
 
(15) Un idraulico guadagna molti soldi  
 A plumber earns a lot of money  
 
 The account presented in this paper solves this puzzle. 
 More generally, both the extensional and the modal account, as presented in 
Krifka et al. 1995, are not at ease with the fact that ISs do not form a uniform 
class of statements. While some of them provide definitional statements as in (16), 
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others cannot be considered as definitional (17-a), (17-b)3. 
 
(16) Un madrigale è polifonico  
 A madrigal is polyphonic  
(17) a. Un calciatore guadagna molti soldi  
 A football player earns a lot  
 b. Una tartaruga vive a lungo  
 A turtle lives a long time  
 
 These two types of statements behave differently with regard to tolerance to 
exceptions, and clearly the first ones (like (16)) are more resistant to exceptional 
individuals: if a madrigal is not polyphonic, it is not a madrigal. The latter ones 
(like (17-a) and (17-b)) are more permeable to them. There certainly are football 
players who do not earn a huge amount of money (e.g., in the third Italian league, 
in Africa) and turtles that do not live a long time span.  
Moreover, as the authors themselves observe, the modal account that they 
propose makes some unsuitable predictions. For (17-b), they explain (Krifka et al. 
ibid. p. 56) that, 
 
“… This sentence evokes a kind of "realistic" modality in which the laws of biology holds. 
However, the worlds in which no turtle ever dies a premature death are biologically highly 
abnormal …” 
 
Another potential problem for the modal account as it is stated in Krifka et 
al. (ibid.) is that, allowing for the use of any type of modal base, it cannot rule out 
temporary properties (18), because in most circumstantially normal worlds it is 
true that raps are popular. 
 
(18)     *A rap is popular 
 
 In the analysis that follows, we espouse an intensional view. We propose 
though a new account that is not based on the reconstruction of a restrictive clause 
(neither a when or if clause) but that is grounded on the notion of ability or 
disposition. We tease apart cases in which the modality is overt from those in 
which it is covert, and provide first an analysis for the latter cases. 
 
2.2    IS sentences as abilitative statements 
 
 If there is no sentential GEN, the generic interpretation must arise in a 
different manner.  
 Carlson (1977), Rimell (2004) (see also Boneh and Doron, 2008) propose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 These cases are also problematic for ‘in virtue of’ theories (Greeberg, 2002). For (16), these 
theories explain that IS statements express that a madrigal is polyphonic in virtue of some intrinsic 
property. It is however difficult to establish in virtue of what intrinsic property a soccer player 
earns a lot of money.  
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for habitual sentences like John walks to school that there is a silent HAB that 
does not take sentential scope. HAB is associated with the imperfective 
interpretation of the present tense. 
As many scholars have observed in previous studies, in the absence of a 
spatio-temporal location, the present tense in English has a generic interpretation 
(Kenny, 1975; Declerck, 1988). It is thus legitimate to distinguish a perfective 
interpretation of the present tense, which depends on the quantification of 
situations for its interpretation and an imperfective interpretation of it3. The same 
contrast arises in Italian. 
 
(19) a. Un bambino beve il latte nella sala d’attesa (perfective present tense)  
 A child drinks (the) milk in the waiting room 
 b. Un bambino beve il latte (imperfective present tense)  
 A child drinks (the) milk  
 
In both Carlson’s (1977) and Rimell’s (1994) accounts, HAB is an 
inductive generalization operator. Here, in connection with indefinite generics, we 
do not claim that there is a silent HAB that provides inductive generalization, but 
rather a silent AB which provides intensional generalizations. In order to clearly 
distinguish the two, we note HABext and ABint the operators that provide inductive 
generalizations and intensional generalizations, respectively. A semiformal 
representation of (19-b) can be seen in (20). 
 
(20) ABint (fly)(a bird) 
 
Before getting to the question of what ABint is and how indefinites are 
interpreted in generic statements, we begin by answering the immediate question 
of why there should be an extensional operator in (21-a) but an intensional one in 
(21-b). 
 
(21) a. Anna va a scuola a piedi  
 Anna walks to school  
 b. Un bambino va a scuola a piedi  
 A boy walks to school  
 
It has been extensively argued that indefinites lack their own reference and 
have existential meaning only with presentational verbs (22) or in a context where 
there is quantification over spatio-temporal location (19-a) (Chierchia, 1995; 
McNally, 1998; Dobrovie-Sorin, 2004). 
 
(22) Un uomo è entrato e mi ha parlato (∃ reading)  
 A man entered and talked to me  
 
When quantification over spatio-temporal location is missing, as in generic 
statements, the indefinite lacks specific reference (see also Cohen, 2001 on this). 
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It is impossible to achieve an inductive generalization about entities whose 
reference is not determined in a model. Entities with non-determined reference 
can instead be attributed a capacity, that is to say a principle such that, for a given 
entity, regulates its behavior. Thus, uttering ’a bird flies’ does not commit to the 
fact that some birds fly repeatedly, but only to the fact that if a bird exists, that 
bird has the ability to fly. This bird needs not be an actual one. 
Granted that generic indefinites can be attributed a disposition (or capacity4) 
but not a habit, we now turn to the semantics of abilities. 
 
2.3    ABint and the semantics of abilities 
 
Whereas habits describe observed regularities, abilities have an explanatory 
value. They exist independently of their manifestations and are such that, if 
exercised, can lead to successful action. The semantics of abilities is a very 
complex matter to which we cannot render justice in this paper, which is 
dedicated to the distinction between ISs and DGs.  
 
2.3.1 Capacity in potentia and capacity in acto Here we espouse the standard 
view that abilities are a certain type of possibility (e.g., Aristotle, De 
Interpretatione; Kenny, 1963). Along the lines of the distinction made in 
Aristotle, we distinguish the ’capacity in potentia’ and the ’capacity in acto’ 
(Arstt. On interpretation XXIII,a,8 ): 
 
" … ’Possible’ itself is ambiguous. It is used, on the one hand of facts and of things that are 
actualized; it is ’possible’ for someone to walk, inasmuch as he actually walks, and in generally we 
call a thing ’possible’ since it is now realized. On the other hand, ’possible’ is used of a thing that 
might be realized; it is possible for someone to walk since in certain conditions he would …  " 
 
The ’capacity in acto’ is in fact a ’necessary’ capacity as Aristotle himself 
claims a few paragraphs later. A capacity in acto holds in virtue of the existence 
of the bearer of the capacity. The analysis of the capacity in acto then comprises a 
form of entailment of the form (23), and in this respect our analysis agrees with 
most of the available approaches. (P and Q are, respectively, the properties 
denoted by the NP and the VP). 
 
(23) ∀x(P(x) → Q(x))  
 
This entailment, explains Aristotle, always holds, provided that worlds are 
nomologically and alethically similar to the actual world (e.g. fire burns in all 
worlds in which the fire has the physical properties that it has in the actual world). 
(cf. infra, (25)). 
Moreover, because the capacity in acto is necessarily exercised as long as 
the bearer of the capacity exists, the temporal extent of the property coincides 
with the temporal existence of the bearer. This does not require that the property 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Here we use the terms dispositions, capacity and ability indistinguishably from each other.	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be ‘permanent’. Permanency is a consequence of this requirement: the property 
holds during the ‘life’ of the bearer. As a further consequence, the property does 
not have to hold in a spatio-temporally bounded situation. As a result, when in IS 
sentences the verb is stative, it can denote the capacity is in acto. 
 Capacity in potentia can either be expressed by a stative verb (24-a)-(24-b) 
or by an eventive one (24c). However, as we have already mentioned (see  Kenny, 
1975), when the property expressed in the present tense is not relativized to a 
particular spatio-temporal situation, the present tense gives rise to a generic 
interpretation. More specifically, it gives rise to the abilitative interpretation of the 
sentence. Since an ability is a permanent state of the entity that possesses it, we 
assume that, in this case, the eventive predicate is coerced into a stative via ABint 
(24-c)5.  
When the capacity in potentia is expressed by an eventive predicate turned 
into a stative, the capacity is exercised only in particular circumstances. In both 
these cases, the capacity in potentia is not actualized by the mere existence of the 
bearer of the capacity and some other conditions must be met.  
 
(24) a. Una tartaruga vive a lungo  
 A turtle lives a long time span  
 b. Un giocatore di calcio guadagna molti soldi  
 A soccer player earns a lot of money  
 c. Una Ferrari va a 200km/ph  
 A Ferrari goes at 200km/ph 
 
The question then arises of what is the modal base for ABint. Here we propose that 
the worlds that are quantified over are those in which all impediments are absent. 
The conditional (see infra) expressed by the generic sentence is evaluated ‘in 
abstracto’, that is to say in worlds in which accidents and irregularities are absent.  
 
2.3.2 An abilitative modal base: absence of impeding conditions Absence of 
impeding conditions is to be carefully distinguished from normalcy conditions. 
Normalcy conditions have been argued to be of two sorts. They can correspond to 
some observed regularities in the actual world (à la Cohen, 1999), or to some 
explicative principle (à la Nickel, 2009). 
Assume first that normal worlds are those in which the regularities available 
in the actual worlds are also present (hence we understand ’normalcy conditions’ 
in an inductive way, as observed regularities in the actual world). According to 
this view, the intended interpretation of (24-a) cannot be derived because under 
normal circumstances, given the actual world, turtles die very young because they 
are eaten by predators. 
Assuming instead that ’normalcy conditions’ are some type of explicative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  That the generic reading arises when the property is not bounded to particular spatio-temporal locations, will 
allows us to predict that stative predicates that denote properties holding in particular spatio-temporal locations (i.e. 
stage-level statives, see e.g. Fernald, 2000) are not acceptable with a generic interpretation (see comment to (30), 
infra).	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principle, we fall short of an explanation for (24-b) because there is no regulatory 
principle intrinsic to being a soccer player that justifies his earning a lot of money. 
Impeding conditions are thus a very weak form of restriction over possible 
worlds. This reflects the fact that they are associated with a silent operator 
(namely ABint) and when a silent operator is used, it generally has a weaker 
interpretation than overt ones, because covert operators are there by default. 
We now turn to the implementation of the account. 
 
2.4    IS statements: Analysis 
 
This distinction between the capacity in acto and capacity in potentia gives 
rise to different types of entailments. Because capacity is a modal notion, 
quantification over worlds will be used. In particular we will be using universal 
quantification over possible worlds. This is straightforwardly justified in the case 
of capacities in acto, which are ’necessary capacities’. 
As for capacities in acto, the existence of the bearer entails the existence of 
the ability. The set of worlds quantified over are thus simply restricted to 
circumstantially accessible worlds. 
 
(25) Capacity in acto  
 λw ∀w′[[Acc(w′,w)]→ ∀x[P(x,w′) → Q(x,w′))]] 
 Paraphrase: Given a world of evaluation w, for all worlds w′, if w’ is 
 accessible from w, then for all x, if  x is P in w′, then x is Q in w′. 
 
Regarding the analysis of capacity in potentia, universal quantification is 
restricted to worlds in which there are no impeding conditions. 
 
(26) Capacity in potentia with a stative (24-a)  
 λw∀w′[[No−impedements(w′,w)] → 
 ∀x[P(x,w′) → Q(x,w′))]]  
 Paraphrase: Given a world of evaluation w, for all worlds w′, if w’ is 
 accessible from w with no impediment to the exercise of the capacity, 
 then for all x, if  x is P in w′, then x is Q in w′. 
 
In (24-a) impeding conditions are the presence of predators, lack of food, 
etc. In the absence of these impeding conditions, a turtle has a long life span. 
Similarly for (24-b), in the absence of impeding conditions (e.g., playing in the 
third African league), a soccer player earns a lot of money. 
When the capacity in potentia is expressed by an eventive coerced into a 
stative, a situation variable is used to signal that the capacity, in worlds in which 
there are no-impeding conditions, has instantiations in specific spatio-temporal 
situations. In (24-c) if the Ferrari in not broken (impeding condition), then in 
some relevant circumstances, the Ferrari goes at 200 km/ph. C is a predicate that 
relates situations, individuals and worlds, and which returns contextually relevant 
situations in which x is involved in world w (see also Greeenberg, 2002).  
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(27) Capacity in potentia with a coerced event (24-c)  
 λw∀w′[[No−impedements(w′,w)] → 
 ∀xs, [(P(x,w′) & C(x,w’,s)) → Q(x,w′))]]]  
 Paraphrase: Given a world of evaluation w, for all worlds w′, if w’ is 
 accessible from w with no impediment to the exercise of the capacity, 
 then for all x, if x is P in w′ and x is in some relevant situation s in 
 w′ then x is Q in w′. 
 
2.5    Some other consequences of the account 
 
In analyzing ISs as abilitative statements, the account grasps a variety of 
judgments that ISs can express. As noted above, ISs are not always definitional. 
The notion of capacity in acto requires unrestricted quantification over 
circumstantially accessible worlds. As for the ’capacity in potentia’, instead, 
worlds in which the generalization holds are worlds in which there is no 
impediment. 
As we have noted, restriction to these worlds does not amount to restriction 
to ’normal worlds’ and we have shown above how these two notions differ. 
 
2.5.1    Difference between overt ‘can’ and covert ABint  The restriction of 
lack of impeding conditions pending on covert modality is weaker than the one 
pending on the overt abilitative modality. In fact, it has been observed that the 
overt abilitative modal ’can’ is associated with an inference of ’effort,’ according 
to which there are specific conditions under which the action is carried out 
(Kenny, 1963; and more recently, e.g., Giannakidou and Staraki, 2010). This 
inference is absent when the abilitative interpretation is reconstructed. This 
explains the contrast in (14-a)- (14-b) repeated in (28-a)- (28-b). As noted in 
Krifka et al., (28-a) and (28-b) are not synonymous and (28-b) is in fact odd.  
(28-b) implies in fact that a boat floats only in worlds where it has to 
overcome some impediment, and it is therefore odd.  
 
(28) a.  Una barca galleggia  
 A boat floats  
 b. ??Una barca può galleggiare  
 ??A boat can float 
  
This argument also grasps the subtle difference in the interpretation of (29-
a) and (29-b). This first asserts that, provided there are no impediments (e.g. the 
Ferrari works properly, there are no speed limit restrictions etc), in some 
particular situations (e.g. those in which the driver wants to), the Ferrari goes at 
200km/ph. The latter implies instead that the Ferrari achieves a peculiar goal that 
requires that specific conditions be met (e.g. that a special technology be used 
etc). (29-b) is thus also associated with an inference that the goal achieved is 
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exceptional and this inference is absent from (29-a)6.  
 
(29) a. Una Ferrari va a 200 km/ph / A Ferrari goes at 200 km/ph  
 b. Una Ferrari può andare a 200 km/ph / A Ferrari can go at 200 km/ph  
 
2.5.2    Incompatibility with temporary statives The account predicts that an 
indefinite cannot be combined with predicates denoting accidental properties.  
 
(30) *Un rap è popolare  
 *A rap is popular  
 
Accidental properties are bounded to spatio-temporal locations and are thus 
perfective in nature. A rap is ‘popular’ in a certain location, and likely, for a 
certain time. Unlike an eventive predicate in the present tense, a stative that 
denotes a spatio-temporally bounded property (e.g., McNally, 1998; Fernald, 
2000), cannot have an imperfective interpretation. Hence ABint cannot be 
reconstructed and the interpretation cannot be carried out7. 
To make the sentence acceptable, a temporal adverb or a when-clause is 
used. In these cases de Swart (1991) analysis applies (e.g., Dobrovie-Sorin (2004) 
for French). (See (10-b) for the analysis of (31-a)-(31-b)). 
 
(31) a. Un madrigale è sempre popolare  
 A madrigal is always popular  
 b. Un madrigale è popolare quando è suonato bene  
 A madrigal is popular when it is well played  
 
2.5.3 IS statements are not definitional It has been often noted in the Romance 
linguistic literature that indefinite statements have a prescriptive use (Corblin, 
1987; Carlier, 1996; Mari, 2008) or a moral flavor (Cohen, 2002).  
 
(32) Una pianta ha bisogno di acqua per vivere !  
  A plant needs water to live !  
 
It has also been argued that ISs are definitional, that they express rules and 
regulations and that they lack propositional content (Cohen, 2001). Burton 
Roberts (1977) observes for A gentleman opens doors for ladies that “if Emile 
does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [it] and thereby 
successfully imply that Emilie was not, or was not being a gentleman”. Mari and 
Martin (2009) develop an account along these lines and argue that the sentence 
asserts what it means to be a gentleman. If one does not satisfy the property of 
opening doors for ladies, it is concluded that one is not being a gentleman. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For a detailed discussion on abilitative modality, see Mari, Beyssade, Del Prete (forthcoming).  
7 We are not claiming here that accidental properties enter the logical form with an event 
argument. Instead, we assume that they need a that a spatio-temporal locatation be (c)overtly 
specified in order to be used.  
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This view undermines the fact that exceptional individuals can still be 
accommodated in ISs. (33-a) is compatible with the fact that although there are 
football players (in the third Italian league, for instance) who do not earn a lot of 
money, they are still football players. What defines a football player is not his 
earning a lot of money. Similarly, for (33-b), turtles that do not live a long time 
are certainly turtles. 
 
(33) a. Un giocatore di calcio guadagna molti soldi  
 A soccer player earns a lot of money 
 b. Una tartaruga vive a lungo  
 A turtle lives a long time span  
 
It is nonetheless correct that, in some cases, ISs have a prescriptive use. 
However, ISs with prescriptive use usually have an overt quasi-modal or modality 
as in (32) or (34). 
 
(34) Une jeune femme doit bien se comporter  
 A young lady must behave well  
 
In these cases the modal analysis straightforwardly applies (12-c). Here the 
choice of the modal base is determined by the modal itself (see Krifka et al., 
1995). In (32) the quasi-modal ‘to need’ (aver bisogno) is deontic and the 
prescriptive use is enhanced by the deontic reading of the modal. The sentence is 
thus analyzed as ’it is necessary that plants get watered’ (see (12-c), with a denotic 
modal base). In cases which have been argued to have a prescriptive use and in 
which there is no overt modality, the role of prosody has been very much 
undermined. These statements can be turned into a rule only if they are turned into 
imperatives by the appropriate intonation. An analysis of prosody is outside the 
scope of this paper8. 
 
 
2.5.3    ISs do not express inductive generalizations The account that we have 
proposed here also does not espouse the view that indefinite generic sentences can 
express inductive generalizations (as suggested in Putnam, 1975). One could 
argue that it is legitimate to assume that in order to utter (24-b), the speaker must 
have heard of rich soccer players. Assuming that in the actual world there are 
regularities that hold for a reasonable amount of time, the speaker is entitled to 
conclude that a soccer player is rich also at the time of the utterance. As already 
pointed out, the view that ISs express inductive generalizations would predict that 
a turtle lives a short time span since most turtles in the actual world die young. 
Our account does not commit us to this view.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 On the relation between deontic modality and imperatives, see Portner, 2009. 
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3     DG sentences 
 
3.1    The questions 
 
It has been noted that DGs express inductive generalizations in the same 
way that BPs do in English. 
 
(35) a. (En.) Italians eat pasta 
 b. (It.) Gli Italiani mangiano la pasta  
 The Italians eat pasta 
 
 Relatedly, it has been noted that DGs better tolerate exceptions than ISs. 
The following is a perfectly acceptable discourse in which John is introduced as a 
true exception to the rule (Mari and Martin, 2009). 
 
(36) A. I professori nella mia università portano la cravatta.  
 B. Ma no, guarda Giovanni.  
 A. ’The’ professors in my university wear a tie. B. No ! Look at John !  
 
 This fact is straightforwardly explained in Farkas and de Swart’s (2007) 
account. The authors have argued that DGs compare two sets of individuals. They 
state that plural definites have determined reference, namely, the value assigned to 
these discourse referents in the model must be fixed (hence the use of ‘!’ in (37-
b)). Since Farkas and de Swart assume that GEN is interpreted as meaning ‘in 
most situations’, it quantifies over situations. In their analysis, sentence (37a) 
means that in most situations, if there are hungry dogs in there, dogs are 
dangerous. 
 
(37) a. I cani affamati sono pericolosi  
 The hungry dogs are dangerous  
 b. GENs,x[!dogs(x) & Pl(x) & hungry(x) & in(x,s)][dangerous(x,s)]  
 
However, definite plurals are compatible with a variety of uses, and, 
depending on which use is targeted, DGs tolerate different types of exceptions. 
1. Assume that I am reporting about the habit of actual professors in my 
university. In this case (38), exceptions as individuals are allowed. 
 
(38)      Scenario 1: Description of the habit of professors in my university  
 Nella mia università, i professori portano la cravatta tranne Gianni 
 In my university, the professors wear a tie but John 
 
2. Assume instead that I am stating how professors behave in a university. 
In this case, exceptions as individuals cannot be accommodated, but only 
exceptions as classes (39).  
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(39) Scenario 2: general fact about professors in university 
 I professori portano la cravatta, tranne quelli associati/*Gianni 
 In my university, the professors wear a tie, but the associate ones/*John 
 
Since DGs express generalizations that BPs express in English, one can 
wonder whether a unified analysis can be given to both. Two types of analyses 
have been provided for BPs.  
One type of analysis treats them as indefinites. They are thus argued to 
provide a variable that gets bound by a universal intensional quantifier 
(Greenberg, 2002). This analysis cannot apply to Romance languages because 
definites do not provide a free variable but are referential expressions. Two main 
arguments illustrate this point. Firstly, differently from bare plurals in English, 
definite plurals in Italian cannot be used in ‘there’ constructions.  
 
(40)   a There are dogs behind the fence 
 b. ??Ci sono i cani dall’altra parte della barriera 
 
This can be explained if one admits that definites assert (à la Russel) or 
presuppose (à la Frege-Strawson, see recently Zucchi, 1995) the existence of their 
referent. In both cases, their meaning would be incompatible with the ‘there 
constructions’ that introduce a new entity.  
Secondly, in generic sentences, DGs have a more restricted use than BPs. 
As well known (see Kratzer, 1989), sentence (41) can have two interpretations. 
On the interpretation in (41b) the sentence is about typhoons and asserts that they 
arise in this part of the pacific. On the interpretation in (41c) the sentence is about 
this part of the pacific and states that there are typhoons in it. In this second case 
typhoons is interpreted existentially. These interpretations are available in English 
on the assumption that bare nouns introduce a variable that can be bounded either 
by GEN or the existential quantifier.  
 
(41)  a. Typhoons arise in this part of the pacific    
 b. GEN x (typhoons(x)) ∃1 (this part of the pacific(1) & arise-in(x,1) 
 c. GEN 1 (this part of the pacific(1) ∃x (typhoon (x) & arise-in (x,1)) 
 
The same sentence in Italian can only be about individual typhoons and 
does not have the interpretation in (41c). Only the interpretation in (41b) is 
available with definite plurals. Hence these cannot be treated as providing a 
variable in the way BPs do.  
Another analysis treats BPs as denoting kinds at least in their generic 
interpretation (see e.g. Cohen, 2001). One can then suggest that like BPs, DGs 
also denote kinds.  
There are two different ways of representing kinds. One the Carlsonian 
view, these are singular entities. Cohen (2001) has pointed out the problem of this 
view: BPs are about individuals and not about kinds (which are singular entities). 
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Kings are generous is for instance about individual kings and not about the kind 
‘king’. 
Farkas and de Swart (2007) have also defended the idea that BPs denote 
kinds, but have proposed to treat kinds as plural individuals. It has also to be 
noted that these individuals need not be member of a kind, as the contrast between 
(42-a)-(43-a) and (42-b)-(43-b) shows.  
 
(42) a. (Fr.) ??Le CD est fragile  
 The CD is fragile  
 b. (Fr.) Les CDs sont fragiles  
 The CDs are fragile (Beyssade, p.c.)  
 
(43) a. (It.) ??Il CD è fragile  
 The CD is fragile 
 b.  (It.) I CDs sono fragili  
 The CDs are fragile (Beyssade, p.c.)  
 
In their unified treatment of BPs and DGs in English and in Romance, 
Farkas and de Swart propose (ibid.) that GEN quantifies over situations (see (37-
b)), and obtain the exact same set of readings for both and it is not clear how they 
would disallow reading (41c) for DGs. We have already mentioned the 
shortcomings of assuming generic quantification over situations. Here we adopt 
Farkas and de Swart’s view that DGs refer to maximal entities, but offer a 
different analysis of the sentence which does not rely on GEN as quantifying over 
situations by default.  
In the account we propose here, situations are also attributed a prominent 
role, but in a manner that accounts for the fact that DGs are only about individuals 
and not about situations.  
 
 
3.2    DGs: analysis 
 
We adopt the Russelian view and the recent Schwarzschild’s (2009) 
implementation, according to which definites denote a fixed set of elements in a 
situation and come equipped in the logical form with a situation variable. Along 
with Kratzer (2002) we assume that situations are parts of worlds. Situations and 
worlds are thus introduced as variables that wait to be bounded. On the two 
above-mentioned interpretations of DGs, they can either be lambda abstracted or 
they can be bounded by the universal quantifier (GEN). The resulting analysis for 
the uses of DGs is given in (44) and (45). (As in Farkas and de Swart (2007), the 
distributive predicate induces universal quantification over individuals in the 
maximal sum ιX.) 
 
(44) λw,s ιX(P(ιX,s,w) & ∀x ∈ ιX Q(x,s,w))  
 For a given world w, a situation s and the maximal sum X, the maximal 
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 sum is P in s,w, and for all elements x in X, x is Q in s,w. 
 
(45)  ∀w′≤w, s ιX(P(ιX,s,w′) → ∀x ∈ ιX Q(x,s,w′))9  
 For all worlds w’ which are maximally similar to w, for all situations s 
 and the maximal sum X, if the maximal sum is P in s,w’, then, for all 
 elements x in X, x is Q in s,w’. 
 
In (44) the generalization is about individuals in the actual world in a given 
situation. For (38) it states that, given the set of professors in my university, every 
professor wears a tie. Because it is entailed that there are actual individuals, actual 
exceptional individuals can be accommodated. 
In (45) the generalization is about worlds and situations. The existence of 
actual individuals is not entailed, and this explains why in (39) it is difficult to 
accommodate actual individuals as exceptions. 
In a third configuration, the world is lambda abstracted and the situation 
variable is universally bounded (46). Here the generalization is about situations of 
the actual world (see (46)). It states that if a member of the maximal sum X 
satisfying property P is involved in s, then it is also Q in s. The existence of actual 
individuals in actual situations of the actual world is not entailed. However, since 
situations are parts of worlds, one cannot know what goes on in a particular 
situation unless one has observed it. Regularities about situations in the actual 
world are generally derived on the basis of induction. Hence the existence of 
actual xs is inferred.  
In this case, as in (44), it is thus possible to accommodate exceptions, as 
actual individuals. The general strategy for such accommodation is along the lines 
proposed by Lasersohn (1999), who argues that all types of precise measures (like 
’all’ or ’maximal sum’) are compatible with a pragmatic halo which allows 
approximating (without necessarily reaching) the limit. 
 
(46)  λw,∀s ιX(∀x ∈ ιX(P(x,s,w) → Q(x,s,w)))  
 For a given world w, for all situations s and the maximal sum X, for all 
 elements x in X, if x is P in s,w then x is Q in s,w. 
 
(47) I madrigali sono popolari  
 The madrigals are popular  
 
The present account derives the prediction that definites are compatible with 
accidental properties because they provide the spatio-temporal location that 
accidental properties need to be used. 
 
4.  Conclusion  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This rule of interpretation is in essence that proposed by Farkas and de Swart (2007). Here we 
obtain the same result without assuming that GEN quantifies by default over situations and that 
there is a sillent ‘always’.  
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In this paper we have proposed a new LF for ISs and DGs in Italian. For the 
first ones, we have introduced a new verbal quantifier ABint that is analyzed as an 
abilitative modal. ABint is triggered by the imperfective interpretation of the 
present tense that arises in the absence of any specification of a spatio-temporal 
location.  
Adopting the Aristotelian distinction between capacities in acto and 
capacities in potentia, we have shown that covert ABint has a different 
interpretation than the overt abilitative modal ‘can’. In particular its modal basis is 
restricted to worlds in which there are no impediments, and it is not associated 
with an inference of effort. 
We also argued that IS statements are not all definitional, and it is legitimate 
to wonder whether, ultimately, they are able to express inductive generalizations. 
As for uttering ‘a soccer player earns a lot of money’, it is likely that the speaker 
has heard of rich soccer players.  
Knowing how the generalization is achieved, however, is a separate 
question from knowing what the sentence asserts. Its truth-value is computed 
uniquely from the meaning components, and ISs turn out to be true even in the 
absence of actual individuals in the world of evaluation w.  
ISs are thus correctly predicted to be incompatible with predicates denote 
temporary states. These are by nature perfective and bounded to spatio-temporal 
locations.  
As for DGs, we have argued that plural definites enter in the logical form 
with a situation variable that is responsible for their being compatible with non-
definitional statements. Assuming that situations are parts of worlds, we have also 
shown that by differentiating the operations on worlds and situations, various 
interpretations of DGs can be derived.   
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